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Abstract: Studying lifetime income inequality for individuals who belong to the same cohort 
can contribute valuable insights that cannot be obtained by usual analyses of annual 
incomes. Data from the social security system indicates that in West Germany, over the 
cohorts born between 1935 and 1972, lifetime earnings inequality has strongly increased. 
For male baby-boomers, lifetime inequality is predicted to be 85 % larger than in the case of 
their fathers. This is larger than the increase of inequality in the cross-section and points to 
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Nowadays, politicians and pundits often repeat that economic inequality is too large and 
that we should do something in order to reduce it, or at least to prevent it from growing 
further. Even institutions like the IMF - that in the past could not care less about inequality - 
currently warn about the bleak economic perspectives of societies that fall apart. 
Worldwide, fighting inequality is considered a hot issue again. 
However, the empirical evidence on inequality that is brought to the fore stems almost 
invariably from distributions of annual incomes in some country. Such distributions are 
calculated from samples that include people at very different stages of their lifecycles and 
work careers. They include 20-years-old apprentices and their 60-years-old superiors; they 
include individuals who are on a steeply increasing wage path and individuals whose wage 
trajectories are completely flat; they include employees who in that particular year received 
extra bonuses and employees who in the very same year were temporarily put on reduced 
working time and reduced pay. Couldn’t it be that all those transitory inequality factors just 
wash out if you adopt a longer time horizon? Couldn’t it be that the alleged increase of 
inequality actually vanishes if you take a lifetime perspective?  
These questions need to be addressed because we as economists are especially interested in 
the inequality of people’s opportunity sets. Those opportunity sets are usually conceived of 
as long-run opportunity sets, covering the bulk of people’s lives. And indeed, if it is the 
inequality of lifetime chances that pulls individuals and groups in a society apart from each 
other, it is lifetime inequality that we should be looking at.  
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that a lifetime perspective on inequality can 
contribute radically new insights that substantially add to the ones gained through analyses 
of annual incomes. In order to substantiate this claim I will first focus on lifetime inequality 
for individuals who belong to the same generation. Then, I will switch to the evolution of 
lifetime inequality across generations. In each part I will first present the main theoretical 
concepts and then discuss some empirical results from an ongoing research project 
concerning Germany.  
The notion that lifetime income inequality may be the best way to gauge the inequality of 
people’s opportunity sets is an old one that goes back to seminal works by Franco Modigliani 
and Milton Friedman in the 1950s. However, the required data in order to study lifetime 
inequality is hard to come by, which explains why even most recent papers on lifetime 
inequality are usually based on simulated income biographies rather than on actual ones 
(Bowlus and Robin, 2011; Heathcote et al., 2005; Hugget et al., 2011). Such simulations make 
use of a number of more or less heroic assumptions and are therefore more like educated 
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guesses than factual descriptions of reality. In the current paper I will therefore concentrate 
on actual income biographies.1 
Once you have the data to answer the question about actual lifetime inequality, you can also 
use it to answer related questions like: how does annual income inequality evolve over the 
life cycle? How does mobility in the distribution of early income vary with age? What is 
association of yearly and lifetime income over the life cycle? These are issues with far-
reaching implications for economic theory and economic policy. For instance, take the very 
last one. It is still the case today that in much empirical work researchers employ some 
measures of short-term income although the theoretical relevant construct is long-run or 
permanent income. By assessing the empirical association between yearly and lifetime 
incomes you can evaluate the kind of bias entailed by the use of yearly income as a proxy of 
permanent income. 
 
2. Concepts of lifetime inequality 
A good point to start thinking about lifetime income is a stripped-down version of the well-
known life-cycle model. Gauging the amount of resources to which individuals have access 
to during their lifetime boils down to evaluate the maximum present value that an individual 
can potentially spend on consumption goods. The standard life-cycle model portrays an 
individual that faces a number of per-period budget constraints that can be integrated into 
an intertemporal budget constraint. In its basic version, this can be written as: 
 
�




                                                                  (1)  
 
On the left-hand side appears the present value of consumption which the individual enjoys 
from some initial date 0 to some final date T and discounts at the rate of interest r. On the 
right-hand side you find the corresponding present value of earnings. The latter can thus be 
used to measure the value of the opportunity set faced by the individual during her lifetime. 
Eq. (1) is just a first approximation. It can be improved upon by taking into account the fact 
that individuals also receive bequests that they can use for own consumption or for leaving 
bequests themselves – which may be interpreted as a special way the individual consumes 
her lifetime resources. Then, the intertemporal budget constraint becomes: 
                                                          
1 The pioneering paper on actual income biographies is by Björklund (1993) who investigated lifetime incomes 
for a sample of Swedish men born between 1924 and 1936. Differently from the research that I present in this 
paper, his study uses register data on tax-assessed income and the samples for each cohort are small. 
However, some findings related to the difference between lifetime and annual inequality and to the pattern of 









                                                  (2)  
 
On its left-hand side there is the bequest that the individual leaves at the end of her life 
cycle and on the right-hand side you find the bequest received by the individual at the 
beginning of her lifecycle. 
A further improvement on the definition of lifetime income given by the right-hand-side of 




𝐶𝑡(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 + 𝐵(1 + 𝑟)𝑇 + � (𝐻𝑡 − ℎ𝑡)𝑤𝑡(1 + 𝑟)𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0




                           (3) 
 
On the right hand side of (3) the present value of earnings has been replaced by the present 
value of full incomes, where w stands for the wage rate while H is the total time endowment 
of the individual. Correspondingly, on the other side of the equation you have h which 
denotes the working time of the individual.2 
Finally, one should take the impact of governmental redistribution on lifetime resources into 
account. This yields the following relationship:   
�
𝐶𝑡(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 + 𝐵(1 + 𝑟)𝑇 + � (𝐻𝑡 − ℎ𝑡)𝑤𝑡(1 + 𝑟)𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0







        (4) 
 
The definition of lifetime income on the right-hand side now includes the net taxes that are 
paid by the individual over its life cycle, also computed in present-value terms. 
From a theoretical point of view, the above concepts are straightforward.  However, once 
you try to implement them empirically, several difficulties arise. Some are well-known from 
usual analyses of cross-sectional inequality. For instance, researchers must cope with the 
problem of choosing the reference unit, which can be the individual or the household or the 
                                                          
2 In case of household production, h should be thought of as the sum of time devoted to market work and 
household work, while C would incorporate the value of goods produced within the household. 
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tax unit. There is the issue of the appropriate equivalence scale, which means the way in 
which one adjusts for the size and composition of the household. You also have to find a 
reasonable method to evaluate in-kind benefits that individuals obtain from the 
government. In addition to all those issues, there are some that are distinctive of the lifetime 
approach and have to do with the intertemporal budget constraint. 
In order to be able to write down the intertemporal budget constraint as in Eqs. (1-4), one 
has to assume perfect capital markets. In reality, capital markets are quite imperfect. Credit 
is rationed and the interest rate at which individuals can borrow money is higher than the 
interest rate that remunerates their savings. This means that the scope for averaging 
consumption over time is reduced, especially so for asset-poor individuals. This should have 
implications for the choice of the method of discounting. In a second-best world with 
imperfect capital markets the discount factor should represent the shadow price of the true 
opportunity cost of time, appropriately mirroring the distortions faced by the various groups 
of the population in the capital market. In practice, the information needed to establish 
those shadow prices is simply not there. Thus, in this type of empirical work we have to live 
with the assumption of perfect capital markets and to hope that our results do not hinge too 
much on that assumption. With this caveat in mind, I now turn to the extent of lifetime 
inequality in Germany. 
 
3. Findings for West Germany 
In what follows I will focus on intra-cohort lifetime earnings inequality - which is to say the 
least ambitious definition of lifetime income – in Germany, investigating inequality among 
people who were born in the same year. The results to be shown are the fruit of an ongoing 
research project with Timm Bönke and Holger Lüthen, some of which are presented in 
greater details in Bönke et al. (2015). 
In this project we analyze waves of data from the German social security system known as 
Versicherungskontenstichprobe. This is a rich dataset that includes monthly information 
about earnings, employment status, sickness and other variables of interest for some 240.00 
individuals per wave. Based on this administrative dataset we have built a sample that 
constitutes the main object of our investigation. Our sample includes West Germans only as 
we want to avoid the difficult issue of comparing earnings received in the FRG with earnings 
received in the GDR. We focus on mandatorily insured West Germans born in 1935 or later 
and exclude so-called fragmentary biographies. In this way we exclude from our sample 
people who have worked only for a short period as employees, typically because they 
became self- employed or civil servants, and for whom no complete earnings careers are 




We define lifetime earnings as social security earnings received by the individual between 
age 17 and age 60. In this paper I will not deal with lifetime inequality for women because 
there has been a huge change with respect to their labor market participation during the 
investigated period, which is from 1951 onwards. Results for female workers can however 
be found in the appendix of Bönke et al. (2015); they are similar to the ones obtained for 
men, albeit less stable. Furthermore, I will focus on German citizens, excluding also 
immigrated ethnic Germans, so as to avoid to pick up effects due to changes in the 
composition of the sample over time. Thus, the results to be presented here refer to a 
relatively homogeneous group: male German natives who always worked as mandatorily 
insured employees in West Germany.3 
Our first finding concerns the magnitude of lifetime earnings inequality. For the cohorts born 
between 1935 and 1952 we can observe the earnings that were received by the individuals 
up to age 60 and hence we can compute their lifetime earnings. Table 1 presents our 
findings about inequality, measured by the Gini-coefficient of lifetime earnings. In order to 
discount earnings we use an average of nominal interest rates on federal governmental 
bonds.4 The corresponding results appear in column (1) of Table 1. We find it instructive also 
to discount earnings by means of the consumer price index, which yields the second column 
of that table. 
 
TABLE 1: Gini coefficients of the distribution of lifetime earnings (1 and 2) and annual 
earnings (3) for West-German men. 
Cohort           (1)        (2)             (3) 
1935 0.156 0.187 0.270 
1936 0.160 0.193 0.272 
1937 0.158 0.191 0.262 
1938 0.157 0.191 0.262 
1939 0.176 0.217 0.284 
1940 0.177 0.218 0.286 
1941 0.173 0.213 0.287 
1942 0.198 0.245 0.309 
1943 0.200 0.247 0.314 
1944 0.181 0.224 0.297 
1945 0.193 0.235 0.307 
1946 0.175 0.212 0.295 
1947 0.202 0.247 0.324 
1948 0.197 0.244 0.323 
1949 0.216 0.265 0.341 
1950 0.198 0.244 0.323 
1951 0.215 0.263 0.337 
1952 0.218 0.261 0.343 
 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2012_Bönke, own calculations using weighted data. 
 
                                                          
3 Several further details on our data, sample and definitions can be found in Bönke et al. (2015). 
4 The corresponding time series is provided by the Bundesbank. 
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As shown by columns (1) and (2), the choice of the discounting method affects the level of 
inequality, but not its pattern. The level of measured inequality is higher if we use lower 
discount rates because people with higher lifetime earnings tend to receive proportionately 
more earnings in the later part of their life cycle. According to our preferred discounting 
method (1), the Gini-coefficient of the intra-cohort distribution of lifetime earning varies 
somewhat between 16 % and 22%. 
How does lifetime inequality compare with annual inequality? Column (3) in Table 1 displays 
the average Gini-coefficient of the distributions of annual earnings for every cohort during 
its life cycle. It turns out that lifetime earnings inequality is somewhat less than 2/3 of annual 
inequality. The difference between the two is due to the mobility of the individuals during 
their life cycle in the yearly distribution of earnings, e.g. poor university students becoming 
well-paid managers when they grow older. This makes the lifetime distribution much more 
compressed than the yearly distribution. 
While lifetime inequality is less severe than annual inequality, it is not negligible. In order to 
see it, recall that the Gini-coefficient is equal to one half of the mean relative difference. This 
means that a Gini-coefficient of 20 % corresponds to a mean relative difference of 40 % 
which is not negligible by any standard. 
In order to better understand the role played by earnings mobility, we have scrutinized the 
evolution of the distribution of annual earnings of a cohort, starting when the cohort is 17-
years-old and following it until it becomes 60-years-old. As shown in Bönke et al. (2015), the 
annual Gini-coefficients display a U-shaped pattern over the life cycle. Intra-cohort earnings 
inequality is large both at the beginning and at the end of the life cycle for the simple reason 
that at both extremes many people don’t participate in the labor market and have therefore 
zero earnings. Just after age 17, inequality of annual earnings goes down quite rapidly with 
age, reaches a minimum when the individuals are entering their thirties and then inequality 
grows again. This second part of the evolution of inequality during the life cycle is in line with 
stochastic models of earnings dynamics that stress the role of learning ability and 
idiosyncratic human capital shocks. According to theory, individuals with higher learning 
ability are predicted to invest more in education at the beginning of their life cycle and to 
have steeper age-earnings profiles. Human-capital shocks are shown to produce persistent 
differences in earnings even if they occur independently over time because of their 
compounding effects. 
Further insights in earnings mobility can be gained by computing the cohort-specific earnings 
rank correlation between two consecutive years. This measure is inversely related to short-
term mobility: the higher is that coefficient, the smaller is the mobility. As we show in Bönke 
et al. (2015), in the beginning of the life cycle there is lot of short-term mobility going on, 
with many people substantially changing their rank in the income distribution from one year 
to the next. But when the cohort grows older, mobility becomes smaller and the rank 
coefficient stabilizes at 0.9 when the cohort gets in their forties. 
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Mobility has noticeable implications for the correlation between annual and lifetime income. 
As shown in Bönke et al. (2015), at the beginning of the life cycle annual earnings contain 
virtually no information about lifetime earnings. Their coefficient of correlation is close to 
zero or even negative. Then, it rapidly increases with age.  We find that between age 35 and 
age 55 the correlation between annual and lifetime income is very high; after 55 it goes 
down again because early retirement begins to set in. For researchers conducting empirical 
investigations this means that if you have no measure of long-run income but you have 
annual income, then you can be confident that the latter is an acceptable proxy for long-run 
income if the individuals are in the age range 35-55.  
All findings about mobility that I have reported are quite in line with what standard theory of 
human capital accumulation predicts. This applies also to age-earnings profiles. In Bönke et 
al. (2015) we have pulled together the cohorts born between 1935 and 1949 and subdivided 
individuals into three groups according to their educational attainment: those who have 
received a college degree, individuals who have received a vocational degree, and 
individuals who have only received a high-school degree. More educated individuals are 
found to receive on average higher lifetime earnings. Logarithmic earnings are increasing 
and concave in age. Moreover, people with higher education attainment have a steeper age-
earnings profile, as predicted by theory.  
 
4. The evolution of lifetime inequality 
In order to pinpoint our results about the evolution of lifetime inequality it is useful to 
contrast them with the thrust of analyses of annual inequality in West Germany. With 
respect to the inequality of earnings, the literature on full-time West German male 
employees has found that inequality at the bottom of the distribution was rather stable until 
the recession of 1993 and rose after that (Card et al., 2013; Dustmann et al., 2009; Fuchs-
Schündeln et al., 2010; Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2007; Prasad, 2004; Steiner and Wagner, 
1998). Overall earnings inequality seems to have increased a bit already before reunification: 
as measured by the percentile ratios of the 85/15 percentile, there was an increase by about 
25 % from 1975 to 2001 (Dustmann et al., 2009). Similar results have been obtained for the 
distribution of equivalized gross household incomes. Inequality in that dimension was pretty 
stable from the mid-eighties to the recession of 1993 and inequality started to rise after 
that. The Gini coefficient increased by some 12 % from 1986 to 2010 (Corneo et al., 2014). 
How does the evolution of intra-cohort lifetime inequality compare to the evolution of 
annual inequality in Germany? Table 1 suggests that lifetime inequality increased somewhat 
for the cohorts born between 1935 and 1952, but the number of cohorts is too small to 
identify a clear trend. The problem, of course, is that we cannot measure lifetime earnings 




In order to cope with that limitation we have generalized the concept of lifetime earnings to 
one of up-to-age-X earnings. Lifetime earnings were defined as the present value of earnings 
received until age 60 and discounted to the year when the individual turned 17. Up-to-age-X 
earnings (UAX) are defined as the present value of earnings received until some age X and 
discounted to the year when the individual turned age 17. Thus, lifetime earnings are a 
special case of UAX for X equal to 60. 
The concept of up-to-age-X earnings lends itself to the following assessment of lifetime 
inequality. Suppose to consider also many cohorts that are still in their working career and to 
trace out the evolution of inequality of the cohort-specific UAX distributions. If we find that 
over the birth year of cohorts the Gini-coefficient of a selected UAX distribution is increasing 
and if we find this upward trend of the Gini coefficient for every X, this would indicate that a 
secular trend of increasing lifetime earnings inequality is underway. In contrast, if we do not 
find such an upward trend or if we find contrasting evolutions for different definitions of X, 
then we could not derive such a striking conclusion. 
 
FIGURE 1: Gini coefficients of UAX for cohorts 1935-1972 
 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2012_Bönke, own calculations using weighted data. 
 
The main result of our investigation can be seen from Figure 1. On the vertical axis you have 
the Gini-coefficient of the UAX distribution for all cohorts in our sample, the youngest being 
born in 1972. On the horizontal axis you have the years of birth of the cohorts, starting with 
1935. The first curve from above represents the evolution of the Gini-coefficient of lifetime 
earnings, i.e. UA-60. A little below that curve there is the one that portrays the Gini-
coefficients of the UA-55, which allows us to include five more cohorts. The same procedure 
applies to the UA-50, UA-45 and UA-40 distributions. We stop at age 40 because, as 
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mentioned in the previous section, before age 40 there is a lot of intra-cohort mobility going 
on, so that at those early ages accumulated earnings are relatively weak indicators of 
lifetime earnings. 
Figure 1 clearly shows an upward trend of lifetime inequality, with a secular rise from the 
cohorts born in the mid-1930s to those born in the early 1970s. This finding of a rise of intra-
generational inequality of lifetime earnings is a novel and intriguing one.5 
Our main finding is not simply the mirror image of the increase in cross-sectional inequality 
because the orders of magnitude are quite different: the rise of intra-cohort lifetime 
inequality is not just moderate, it is substantial. As an example, consider two cohorts, the 
one born in 1935 and the cohort born in 1963, which may be seen as respectively statistical 
fathers and statistical sons. The Gini-coefficient of the UA-45 distribution for the fathers 
equals 12.6 %. The Gini-coefficient of the UA-45 distribution for the sons equals 23.3 %. This 
implies a rise of inequality by 85 %. This is a much bigger order of magnitude than in case of 
the rise of annual earnings inequality.6  
As we show in Bönke et al. (2015), the increase of lifetime inequality hit both the top and the 
bottom of the distribution. But the increase has been stronger at the bottom, especially for 
generations born after the end of the Second World War. This is mirrored in the evolution of 
the absolute level of accumulated earnings at various percentiles of the distribution. Figure 2 
shows the evolution of UA-40 measured in real terms for the P20, the median, and the P80. 
The corresponding UA-40 of the oldest cohort have been normalized to one. As shown in the 
figure, at the level of the P20 the youngest generation received before age 40 earnings that 
in real terms were only 23 % higher than the earnings received by the P20 of the oldest 
cohort before that cohort became 40-years-old. The real UA-40 of the P20 have even 
declined over the younger cohorts. Instead, the median of the youngest cohort, born in 
1972, received earnings until that cohort was 40-years-old that were 59 % higher in real 
terms than the earnings received by the median of the oldest cohort until age 40. In the case 
of the P80, the increase of real UA-40 has been by almost 80%. This shows that the rise of 




                                                          
5 Kopczuk et al. (2010) have computed Gini-coefficients of cohort-specific long-term earnings distributions for 
the US. Long-term earnings merely refer to a 12-year period. They find that the cohorts born after the mid-
1930s have experienced an increasing inequality of such long-term earnings. This points to a likely common 
evolution in the US and Germany. 
6 This underscores the importance of the age composition of the workforce in determining the inequality of 
short-term measures of income. Cohort size rapidly increased in Germany between the birth years 1945 and 
1964. As younger cohorts are characterized by a relatively compressed distribution of annual earnings, this 
compositional change may have generated the impression of a rather stable level of inequality in Germany.   
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FIGURE 2: Growth factors of real UA-40 for median, P20 and P80 
 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2012_Bönke, own calculations using weighted data. 
 
5. Drivers 
A first pass in order to better understand the rise of German lifetime inequality is to 
decompose it into two parts: the increase due to changes in wage dispersion (i.e. changes 
affecting strictly positive earnings) and the one due to the unequal evolution of 
unemployment spells (during which individuals receive zero earnings). The interest of this 
decomposition derives from the peculiar evolution of unemployment in Germany. Before 
the first oil shock, a situation of almost full employment prevailed there. After the first oil 
shock, a lasting stepwise increase of the unemployment rate set in. The low-skilled were 
severely hit, with a rate of unemployment about twice the overall unemployment rate. Since 
unemployment entails zero earnings, one may conjecture that unemployment has been a 
proximate cause for the rise of lifetime earnings inequality in Germany. 
As a matter of fact, our sample does show a very heterogeneous incidence of unemployment 
across cohorts at different parts of the distributions. If we rank individuals according to the 
UA-40, we find that the upper part of the distribution is hardly affected by unemployment, 
and this applies to all cohorts. Things are very different in the lower half of the distribution, 
especially so for the lowest quartile. For that group, the incidence of unemployment was 
very different across cohorts. In case of the oldest cohorts in our sample, before reaching 
age 40 individuals in the lowest quartile had spent on average some five months as 
unemployed. This is not very different from the average unemployment spell for the entire 
cohort. In case of the youngest cohorts instead, before reaching age 40 individuals in the 
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lowest quartile had spent on average more than forty months as unemployed – eight times 
as much.7 
In order to quantify the effect from unemployment on the rise of lifetime inequality we have 
imputed wages to the unemployed. It turns out that the unequal evolution of 
unemployment spells contributes to explain only some 20 % to 40 % of the total increase of 
lifetime earnings inequalities. Furthermore, the evolution of unemployment does contribute 
to explain the inequality rise at the bottom of distribution, but not at the top. 
Thus, some 60 % to 80 % of the increase of lifetime inequality in Germany is due to increased 
cohorts specific wage inequality. Why has lifetime wage inequality increased so much? While 
we still do not have a definite answer, it may be useful to formulate a couple of hypotheses 
in order to guide future empirical work. 
A first hypothesis is that the same factors that led to increased cross-sectional wage 
inequality also led to increased lifetime wage inequality. Research on cross-sectional wage 
inequality for West German men has put forward three main drivers: (i) skill-biased 
technological change is deemed to be an important factor of increasing inequality in the 
upper part of the distribution; (ii) declining union power and vanishing coverage through 
collective wage agreements are considered to be key factors of increased inequality at the 
bottom part of the distribution; (iii) immigration waves, especially in the early nineties, may 
have played a role for increased inequality at the bottom. 
All those three factors could have also increased lifetime wage inequality if firms consider 
workers from young cohorts to be imperfect substitutes for workers from older cohorts. An 
obvious reason for this would be hiring, training and firing costs. This would imply that 
incumbent old workers have a relatively strong bargaining position vis-à-vis their firms and 
therefore could avoid carrying much of the burden of adjusting the labor market to the 
heavy demand and supply shocks that hit the German labor market since the 1970s. 
According to this hypothesis, this burden was mainly carried by the less skilled of the 
younger cohorts – whence the rise of lifetime wage inequality. 
A second hypothesis is that the rise of lifetime wage inequality was generated by changes in 
the intra-cohort distribution of lifetime work effort. I refer to work effort rather than 
working time because there are several additional variables that determine an individual’s 
lifetime wages. Those include educational effort and occupational choice - for instance the 
choice to avoid unsafe, risky, unpleasant occupations even if they would allow one to earn 
more. Lifetime work effort also includes work intensity, which may determine the level of 
performance-related pay received by an individual and the likelihood of getting promoted 
and climbing a firm’s hierarchy. 
                                                          
7 See Bönke et al. (2015, figure 12). 
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Lifetime work effort is a multi-dimensional concept which is hard to measure empirically. 
Still, it should be taken into account. If changes in work effort were driving the rise of 
lifetime wage inequality, its policy implications would be very different from the ones that 
may be derived if factors like skill-biased technological change, union decline and 
immigration were the main culprits. Whereas the latter are circumstances beyond the 
control of individuals, effort has a volitional component, so that to some extent the 
inequality increase may be considered legitimate and acceptable. 
I would like to put forward two possible ways how a change in the distribution of lifetime 
work effort could have generated a rise of lifetime wage inequality. The first channel is the 
evolution of social benefits and taxes in West Germany. After the 1960s, its tax-transfer 
system has become more progressive as compared to the two previous decades. On the one 
hand, social transfers have become more generous in terms of replacement rates and new 
social rights have been granted. On the other hand, the marginal tax rates on wage incomes 
have increased for the bulk of the workforce, especially so if one takes the tax component of 
social contributions into account. 
The increase of progressivity in the tax-transfer system is likely to have generated different 
work incentives for people at different skill levels. For the low-skilled, both the substitution 
and the income effect may have pushed towards a reduction of work effort. For the high-
skilled, the income effect is instead likely to have increased work effort. Hence, changes in 
taxes and transfers might have led to a stronger decrease in lifetime work effort for those in 
the lower part of the skill distribution and hence to more wage dispersion. 
The second possible explanation is based on the effect from sustained economic growth 
upon a population endowed with heterogeneous preferences for money versus leisure. 
Anecdotal evidence abounds in suggesting that people significantly differ with respect to the 
importance they attach to purchasing power. Some individuals endorse materialistic values, 
e.g. they especially like to drive luxury cars and to spend holidays in exclusive places. Others 
have instead post-materialistic priorities, e.g. like to read books, play soccer or chess with 
friends, and spend time with their children. They do not believe to need a lot of money in 
order to realize their life goals. 
Those different types of people may have always existed. However, it is conceivable that 
within the older cohorts, those with cheap tastes chose to exert much work effort because 
their earning ability was low - because of a generally low level of productivity at the time. 
Subsequent economic growth increased the earning potential of everybody, including 
people with cheap tastes. But in contrast to people with expensive tastes, those with cheap 
ones decided to devote part of that productivity gain to enjoy more leisure time with family, 





FIGURE 3: Lifetime choices of materialists and post-materialists. 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the idea. On the horizontal axis is measured lifetime leisure (a constant 
minus lifetime effort), on the vertical axis lifetime consumption. The lifetime budget 
constraint delimits the lifetime opportunity set. Economic growth entails higher labor 
productivity which makes the lifetime budget constraint rotating clockwise. Behavior is 
represented by the expansion path, one for each type of agents. The blue path corresponds 
to those with expensive tastes and the red one to those with cheap tastes. When economic 
growth provides people with higher earnings ability, the materialists keep working a lot and 
end up earning a lot. Instead the post-materialists are characterized by a backward-bending 
labor-supply curve. When their productivity increases, they choose to devote more time to 
other things rather than market work. Thus, their lifetime work effort decreases. The 
divergence between the two types of agents in terms of work effort brings about a 
divergence in terms of wage income.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Over the last sixty years, intra-cohort earnings inequality has hugely increased in Germany. 
This marks a deep difference between the working class that came out of the baby-boom 
generation and the one that came out of its parents’ one. Earnings inequality is not the only 
dimension that marks a substantial intergenerational change from one working class to the 
other. In order to illustrate it, compare once again the fathers-cohort born in 1935 with the 
sons-cohort born in 1963. As mentioned above, from fathers to sons lifetime earnings 
inequality has increased by some 85 %. A similar change occurred with respect to pay 
uncertainty for those in employment. This can be seen by looking at the transitory variance 
of wages measured when the cohort was 40-years-old. As it turns out, pay uncertainty so 
measured has doubled from one generation to the next. Another crucial characteristic for 
14 
 
comparison is the extent of exclusion from the labor market. This can be captured by the 
fraction of a cohort that experienced more than twelve months of unemployment before 
reaching age 40. For those born in 1935, only 2.3 % of them experienced more than one year 
of unemployment before they turned 40. For the cohort born in 1963, 28.2 % made that 
experience – which means that, in contrast to their fathers, a substantial fraction of the 
baby-boom cohort lacked a full integration in the labor market. 
Another striking intergenerational difference may be called - in want for a better term – a 
difference in class imprinting. It refers to workers’ perception to be in a very different 
income category as compared to their bosses, which may have an impact on the formation 
of their class consciousness. The intensity of this perception should increase with the ratio of 
capitalists’ per-capita income to workers’ per-capita income when the latter are in the initial 
years of their working life and make up their mind about industrial relations. Somewhat 
arbitrarily, I define capitalists’ income as the P99.9 of the income distribution, as obtained 
from administrative income-tax data.8 The ratio of this income to the median wage, both 
taken when the cohort was 30-years-old, is thus my proxy measure of class imprinting. 
Comparing the baby-boomers with their parents, it turns out that this ratio has declined by 
34 %. The very high income concentration that prevailed in West Germany in the mid-1960s 
may thus have fostered the formation of a stronger class consciousness for the older 
generation as compared to their children – that were socialized in their workplace in the 
early 1990s, a time at which income concentration was substantially lower. 
This comparison shows that from one generation to the next, Germany has moved from 
having a quite homogeneous workforce, facing business owners that were much wealthier 
than workers, to having a very heterogeneous workforce, facing business owners that were 
not so incredibly wealthier than workers - at least at the time when workers were at the 
beginning of their careers. Arguably, such an evolution has considerably lowered the 
cohesion of the workforce and its members’ feeling of sharing a common fate - with 
potentially far-reaching social and political implications. 
A lifetime perspective can thus reveal the existence of long-run inequality trends that deeply 
affect our societies - trends that may remain unnoticed if one limits the attention to short-
term inequality. Worldwide, several national pension systems are, like the German one, of 
the Bismarckian variety and make therefore use of longitudinal earnings data, often covering 
several generations. It would be useful to harmonize the existing administrative information 
from those countries and assemble it into an international database. That would enable 
researchers to draw cross-country comparisons and to detect worldwide trends of lifetime 
inequality. 
 
                                                          
8 I use gross income, excluding capital gains, as reported in Dell (2008). As shown by Bach et al. (2009), in 
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